No Social Constructs in My Little Town

In Paul Simon’s song “My Little Town”, there is the lyric “everything’s the same in my little town”.  This can be contrasted with "the big city" that is cosmopolitan, multicultural, not all the same.  It is only when you have the experience of more than one culture that it becomes natural to see that there can be more than one notion of how things are.  In Philosophy, when there is one “correct” definition of something, due to it existing in nature, independent of man, it is called a “natural kind”.  However, when something only exists because people have agreed to think that it does, that is called a “social construction”.  Computer programmers need to be aware that, of the things they have to model in their databases, user interfaces & business models, most are social constructions, and hence, there are many ways to skin a cat, but not arbitrary ways.  Two case studies are given that show how programmers can err on either side of the spectrum.

Social Constructs versus Natural Kinds

It is common to consider Natural Kinds to be “discovered”, and Social Constructions to be “invented”.  An example of something that only exists because we say it does is money.  A Bitcoin (or an ounce of gold, or a piece of paper with $100 printed on it) is worth whatever we say it is, and how many Big Macs can be bought with each is whatever we agree upon.  And via the computerized marketplace, we can change our collective mind every microsecond.

Social Constructions are also inherently “relative” to some culture, which means that there can be more than one version of it floating around, and each can be equally valid.  A traditional example is the definition of what it means to be a woman.  While there are the aspects of womanhood that are controlled by DNA and biology, many aspects are defined by society, and there are many different definitions existing simultaneously.

On the other hand, we believe that atoms exists in nature.  We may discover better definitions and understandings of them over time, but those would be mere changes in our knowledge of them, rather than making them an invention.  When Europeans thought that swans only came in white, and then found black ones in West Australia, their definition of swan changed, but we still think that swans are in fact a natural species, independent of whether you’re European.

Natural Kinds that Aren’t

There are times that something is thought to be a natural kind, but later realized to not be, for example, planets.  We thought that planets existed objectively and independent of our latest definition.  We now realize that those orbiting chunks of rock and clouds of gas may exist objectively, but our classifications of “planet” versus “dwarf planet” versus “failed star” do not.  I.E. they are arbitrary enough that aliens landing here will likely have different ways of classifying orbiting stuff.

Saving the Phenomena

So, if planets aren’t “real”, where did they come from?  An early view of the universe was that everything literally revolved around the earth in a perfect circle, except for a handful of “wanderers”, the original meaning of planet.  As we gained more knowledge, we would update our definitions. But we always (if only unconsciously) wanted to “save the phenomena”; in other words, make sure that the new definitions didn’t drop any planets and didn’t add any, otherwise, we would be defining something that did not match our intuitive notion of planets.

Of course, recently that became impossible because we realized that we were either going to have to add hundreds of new “planets”, or, drop Pluto, to be consistent.  The more that people tried to keep the original collection, the more it became clear that the collection was based on culture and history rather than an objective category of things in space.  Some even say that Jupiter is not really a planet, but a failed star.

Case Study: World Headquarters in My Little Town

The world headquarters of Coca-Cola is in Atlanta, and while a world headquarters would be expected to be pretty cosmopolitan, it is in The South which was traditionally very monoculture, conservative, and religious (which I can say because I grew up there).  I was there, on a Y2K project, redesigning data files which were using just 2 digits to represent years (even though the file formats had been specified only two years previously, by the way).  During discussions with the developers (all Atlanta locals), it was assumed that there was only one obvious “correct” way to represent dates in a string: mmddyyyy.  Having lived overseas, I knew to point out that most of the world doesn’t do it that way, instead using ddmmyyyy, or yyyymmdd (and we did not even get into other calendar systems).

The point is that it was assumed that dates were a natural kind when they are actually very socially constructed. In my little town every thing is the same and therefore looks like the one and only way God intended.

Case Study: Bizarrely Arbitrary User Interface at domain.com

While the concept of “social construction” says that there can be several equally-valid ways of defining some things, do not forget about the “social” part! I.E. you should not create an arbitrary definition that no one actually uses and therefore no one will understand.

On the website of domain.com (a domain name registry provider), there is the domain name registration form which includes a mandatory phone number field.  The required format is so bizarre though that it took a chat with customer support to figure out what is was.  It turned out to require the phone number to be entered as the fractional portion of a floating point number…let that sink in…floating point notation, with a mandatory leading plus sign and mandatory integer of 1.  So, phone number “(123) 456-7890” had to be entered as +1.1234567890  ...AND, to make matters worse, the error message received when it was not entered that way, only said that a legal phone number was required, without explaining what the non-obvious required format was.

When I pressed the support chat operator for an answer to my question, WTF?! , I was told (after some time on hold) that “that was the format that the developers chose”. There was no answer to my question: Of all the phone number formats on the planet, who has ever used that?   Apparently it was the culture of domain.com off-shored contract developers with no managers who were engineers enough to review the design.

What is Philosophy?

Because I am endeavoring to teach ideas from Philosophy to computer programmers, who typically have no background in it, a question I must answer right off the bat is "what IS philosophy?"  Here is the answer I provided to a new MOOC "Introduction to Philosophy":

Given that the single word "philosophy" is commonly used to refer to multiple different (albeit related) things, all answers to the question "Q: What is [Western] Philosophy?" actually depend on one: "doing philosophy; the act of philosophizing" which I explain to even children as:

A: Being able to answer the question, Why do you think what you think? Why do you believe what you believe?

And while you want to be able to answer to someone else's satisfaction, you foremost want to be able to answer to your own satisfaction because you want to know the truth. (BTW, the western bit is "we believe humans are capable of working it out ourselves")

All the other things the word philosophy can refer to build on, and depend on, the above. e.g. Philosophy as meaning "the body of knowledge accumulated by those doing philosophy" (which entails history of philosophy, individual ideas, individual philosophers, tools/techniques/criteria for doing it well, favorite topics for philosophizing about, etc, etc) all naturally spring from someone somewhere starting to "do philosophy".

Of course for programmers who will say, "so what does that have to do with me?", I have to quickly add that even thousands of years ago, philosophers already had come up with some really good techniques for describing the world, and being able to justify that those techniques were better than our intuition.  So, since a large portion of our work as programmers is to describe the world via our data models, object models, class hierarchies, classification schemes, etc, etc, we would get better at it if we replaced our intuition with techniques philosophers know but we typically havent been taught.

The purpose of a thing is in US as well as in IT

In an earlier post, I advocated adopting Philosophers' practice of considering the purpose of a thing when creating a definition for that thing.  Plato and Aristotle would have said that one of the things that made an acorn, an acorn, was that it had the "goal" or "purpose" of becoming an oak tree.  In defining a domain model (aka business objects model), document the "purpose" of a class in order to get at its true attributes and behavior. But, as I was recently reminded, not only can the purpose of a thing be "in the thing itself", it can also be solely in our minds.  I.E. it begs the question: if we are defining a class of things, what is our purpose in caring if we know that something is one of those things?

I had this AHA moment after reading the article "Unclassified" in the June 2010 issue of Discover magazine, where I was surprised to learn that there is no accepted universal definition of a biological species; there are at least 20+ competing definitions.  I had thought that "being able to breed fertile offspring" was the definition, but that is only one (and of course it leaves out the vast majority of living things on earth that reproduce asexually).

After having read about all the conflicting ways to organize and cluster individuals into species, each one with its own way of looking at things, it begged the question: Why do you want to know? I.E. What is the purpose of knowing which species something is?"  Depending on why you want to know, you choose one definition over all the others.

But of course as Darwin thought, this would mean that species are not "real". Instead of discovering pre-existing forms, we would merely be inventing arbitrary sets of attributes-in-common. Therefore, unlike the "teleology" of Plato and Aristotle where the "purpose" or "goal" of a species is internal to itself, it would seem that a possibly more important purpose is the one that WE have in wanting to place a particular into that species.

For example, Ponder all of the various shapes, sizes, forms, etc of things that you would want to call a "chair" [and do a Google image search of "chair"]. Now, ponder coming up with a universal definition of chair (such that all chairs would be recognized as such, and nothing else would), and you will see that it will be much easier if you can refer to the purpose we have for them; i.e. being able to sit (comfortably?) on them.  Without that, it is hard to distinguish between a storage box (not a chair) and a storage bench (a chair).  [Try it. Do a Google image search for storage box and then storage bench.]

In this sense, a species would be more like a Java Interface than a Class.  Classes usually embody the pre-existing forms viewpoint, i.e. the notion that attributes and behavior are really "in the thing" rather than merely "how we want to look at it".  And while in practice Interfaces are often just wrappers around class definitions, ideally, each Interface defines a standard socket into which an object of any "form" may fit, as long as it can perform a certain "role" and participate in a certain "protocol" (see my definition of component).

SO, the lesson to learn is: When considering the purpose of a thing as a part of its definition, "purpose" is both its purpose, and our purpose for wanting to recognize one in the first place.

POSTSCRIPT - July 4th, 2011
Once again, I see that I've come to a brilliant insight that someone else did a long time ago. In the new "The Philosophy Book", I just found the following apropos quote: "Every way of classifying a thing is but a way of handling it for some particular purpose"- William James.

Class Constructors considered harmful

PREFACE: There is a school of thought in computer programming that Classes are harmful in certain ways, but the basis for those arguments are very programming-technique specific.  This essay is about a much more general, mind-set oriented, objection.

My basic project these days is to learn Philosophy 101 and contemplate what impact that knowledge should have on software development practices.  After reading topics like the Philosophy of "becoming", and Aristotle's "four causes", it is clear that Philosophers spend much more time trying to define the circumstances of an entity's creation than do system analysts and programmers. While Philosophers have long been concerned with WHY did WHO do WHAT to cause an object to come into being, programmers are mostly concerned with the mechanics of HOW an object should be constructed.  It strikes me that this is due to the tunnel vision encouraged by the class constructor method.  [And, due to destructors and automated garbage collection, an even worse situation applies to object “death”.] So, to paraphrase a famous title, I (albeit tongue-in-cheek) consider Class Constructors harmful.

CASE STUDY: At a recently defunct Top-5 bank, I uncovered the fact that there were major incompatibilities in data being used to produce credit scores for borrowers and their loans. The scores depended on a grade generated for a "facility". The problem was that the very concept and definition of "facility" was not the same in various parts of the bank. If they had answered the following simple questions, they would have realized that they were not talking about the same thing: When and why does a new facility come into existence, and when/why does it cease to exist.

In the course of analysis and requirements gathering, a major goal is to identify and define the various business domain entities. But, in a vicious cycle, the definition of an entity is often too shallow with regard to its birth and death because “causal” information often stagnates as merely background text in some requirements document.  This is because programmers have no standard place to put that logic into the code.

Object oriented practice has one put "all" the properties and behavior associated with an entity into its Class definition, where "all" for class Dog means "the dog, the whole dog, and nothing but the dog"[1].  However the "nothing but the dog" constraint means that, the logic involved in deciding whether an instance of class X should be created, is not normally a method of class X.  Since the "cause" of X's instantiation usually involves other classes, that logic lies outside of X proper, thus, standard development methodologies leave the analysis of causation and purpose out of the design of class X.  Even Factory classes are focused on object construction, rather than why it should be constructed, and why now, and by whom.

The Mediation pattern comes to mind as a place to put this sort of logic because it involves multiple classes.  The logic that decides it is time for a Sculptor to use a Chisel to carve a Statue out of a block of Marble doesn’t belong solely in any of those classes.  A programmer would be tempted to put a “carve” method in Sculptor since that is a “behavior” of the sculptor, but Philosophy considers it an essential part of the definition of the statue itself.  And that is a problem with Mediator classes in the first place; the desire to have everything relevant to X be “nearby in the source code” (a raison d'être for classes) is defeated when some of it is off in various Mediators.  Having the teleology of Statue off in some CarveMediator isn’t much better than it residing in Sculptor.carve().

With event-driven systems (e.g. MOM, SOA), the series of events that trigger the creation of an entity instance may be complex. And whether event-driven, or "batch processing", the sub-systems are often distributed, increasing the value of encapsulating this logic in a single place. With Java EE and service oriented designs, there would be value in having the entity services include this logic.

In any event, I believe that there is a need to learn from Philosophy that their concept of "form" (which is the equivalent of OOP's class) has always included the purpose of a thing as well as its blueprint.

[1] Object Oriented Analysis and Design, Grady Booch,  1991

Model Entities, not just their parts

One of the oldest puzzles in Philosophy is the paradox of how something can change and yet still be considered the same thing. After all, if “same” is defined as “identical; not different; unchanged”, then how can it “change”?  On the other hand, even if I lose that hand (pun intended), I am still the same me. In chapter 5 of Peter Cave’s new book, “this sentence is false”[1], there is a collection of example paradoxes that illustrate how our intuitions about “sameness” are inconsistent.  Some paradoxes involve entities (or properties) whose definition is "vague", as in “How many cows make up a herd?” or “At what weight does adding a pound change you into being ‘fat’?”  However, here I will be focusing on the change paradoxes involving things with a well defined set of parts. They illustrate the problem with defining something as merely the collection of its parts (unless of course “it” is truly only a collection, and not an entity in its own right).

George Washington's axe
Harry: I have here the very axe with which George Washington chopped down the cherry tree. It’s been used by my family for generations.
Sally: But this says “Made in China”!
Harry:  Well, over the years, the handle was replaced each time it wore out. Oh, and the blade’s been replaced a couple of times too.
Sally: But those are the only two parts…that’s not the same axe at all then!!

Ship of Theseus
(original paradox by Plutarch)
Theseus had a ship whose parts were replaced over time such that, at a certain point, no original pieces were left.
How can the latter ship be said to be the same ship as the original if they have no parts in common?

(sequel paradox by Hobbes)
Suppose that those old parts were stockpiled as they were being replaced, and later they were reassembled to make a ship.
NOW, which ship is the same as the original ship; the one with the original parts, or, the one with the replacement parts?

At the bottom of these paradoxes is the question of whether a thing-made-up-of-parts is the same as the collection of all its parts.  I.E. can everything that can be said of the whole thing be equally said of the collection of all its parts, and vice-versa? For 2500 years, western philosophers including Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, right through to the 21st century, have been debating this question, generating whole libraries of book and papers.  In fact, Mereology is an entire field of study that is just about the relationship between parts and their respective wholes.

What does it mean to be an individual?

As discussed (at great length) in the book Parts[2], there is a whole spectrum of things in between “individuals” and “groups”, and they are referred to in everyday language by singular terms (e.g. person), plural terms (e.g. feet), and some words that could mean either (e.g. hair). There are individuals (say, a car), parts of individuals that are themselves individuals (say, a wheel), parts of individuals that are NOT themselves individuals (say, the paint), collections that do not form an individual (say, “the wheels of that car”), collections that DO constitute an individual (say, the car parts that comprise the engine where the engine is itself an individual), and so on, and so on.

A key to distinguishing whether a thing being referred to is truly a thing in its own right (and not just a plural reference masquerading as a single thing) is what sorts of things can be said about it.  Orchestra is an ambiguous term because it can be used as a singular or a plural as in “the orchestra IS playing” vs the equally grammatical “the orchestra ARE playing”.  If it is considered an individual then we can say things about its creation, its history, etc, whereas the plural use simply denotes a collection of players where not much can be said about “it” apart from the count of players, their average age, etc.  Relational Database programmers will recognize individuals as those that get their own record in some entity table, and plurals/sets/collections as equivalent to the result set from some arbitrary query.  SQL aggregate functions (like count, average, minimum, maximum, etc) are the only things that can be said about the result set as a whole. Result sets do not get primary keys because they are not a “thing”, whereas real individuals do (or should!) get their own personal identity key.  Even when an arbitrary query is made to look like an entity by defining a “view”, it is not always possible to perform updates against the search results because the view is not a real entity.

What does it mean to be the same?

A big problem is that there are many different flavors of “sameness” when we say that A is the same as B. Right off the bat there is a difference between Qualitative identity versus Numerical identity. Two things are qualitatively identical if they are duplicates, like a pair of dice. Two things are numerically identical if they are one and the same thing, like the Morning Star and the Evening Star (both of which are, in fact, really the planet Venus).  They are “numerically” identical in that when counting things they only count as one thing.  Another complication is that there is a difference between identity (right this second) versus Identity over time which deals with the whole question of how something can be different at two different times and yet still be considered the same thing.  For example, you are still considered numerically identical to the you of your youth even though you have clearly changed…although this gets into the even more involved topic of Personal Identity [which may or may not apply to an axe ;-) ] Traditionally, if x was identical to y, and y was identical to z, then x had to be identical to z. Relative Identity has been proposed such that this need not be true, thus allowing both the morning and evening stars to be identical to Venus but not to each other.

When specifically asking whether the paradoxical ships and axes are numerically identical, as Peter Cave points out, two of our usual criteria for being “one and the same thing” are in conflict.  They are (a) being composed of largely the same set of parts, and (b) being appropriately continuous through some region of space and time.  The continually refurbished ship meets (b) but the reassembled original parts meet (a).

In traditional logic, as formulated in Leibniz’s Law, two things are the “same” only if everything that can be said about one thing can also be said about the other. In other words, all the properties of each object/entity need to be equal if they are one and the same.  By this token, the two axes and the various ships are not the same.  Of course, this means that ANY change to ANY property causes the new thing to not be “the same” as the old. To avoid this, others have said that only essential and not accidental properties should be compared.  This means that the definitions of “ship” and “axe” should distinguish between those properties that must remain the same throughout the lifetime of the object versus those properties that may change over time.

Java Programmers can relate to the philosophical meanings of “essential” and “accidental” in the following way. [To keep this sidebar simple, think of “entity beans” where only one bean/object/instance is allowed to represent a particular real world entity (e.g. {name=Joe Blow,ssn=123456789})…i.e. there are never multiple object instances in RAM simultaneously representing Joe.]    Class definitions could have “essential” properties implemented via constants (i.e. final instance variables initialized in the constructor ala the Immutable design pattern). And, “accidental” properties are implemented via normal instance members.

The essential properties must be final because if their values were different then they would have to be a different individual.  E.G. If an instance of class Person has a constant DNA_Fingerprint_Code with value of 1234567890, it would not be correct to change that value on that same object because a person’s DNA both defines them and never changes; i.e. “essential” in the Philosophy sense. The correct procedure would be to create a new instance of Person because it must truly be a different person if it has different DNA. [Of course, this brings up the whole separate topic of the difference between changing a property’s value because it has a truly new value versus merely correcting a mistaken value.  Normally, computer software has not been designed to make this distinction even though it would make some systems much more robust, and able to reflect reality better if they did.]

The putative method IsTheSame(Object o) would compare either all properties, or only essential properties, of this and o depending on your philosophy.  [This also brings up the whole separate topic of the Java equals() method, and the many potential meanings of “equals” apparent when thinking Philosophically.]

More than the sum of its parts

So, the particular individual parts of a thing need not all be “essential” properties of that thing, and hence they may change without affecting that thing’s identity.  (You are still you even if you lose a leg or lung, but not a head). Well then, what are some potential essential properties of an individual thing?  Many advocate taking a look at Aristotle’s “four causes” of a thing, where he defined “cause” as anything that was involved in the creation of that thing.  His two main varieties of causes were intrinsic, for causes that are “in the object”, and extrinsic, for those that are not.  The two sub-varieties of intrinsic causes were material cause (the material the thing consists of) and formal cause (the thing’s form [OOP programmers think Class]).  The two sub-varieties of extrinsic causes were efficient cause (the “who” or “what” that made it happen, or “how”) and final cause (the goal, or purpose, or “why”).

By analyzing the paradoxes using Aristotle’s causes it can be argued that the Ship of Theseus is the same ship, because the form does not change, even though the material used to construct it may vary with time. Also, the Ship of Theseus would have the same purpose, that is, transporting Theseus, even though its material would change with time.  The builders and tools used may, or may not, have been the same, therefore, depending on how important the efficient cause is to you, it would make more or less of a difference.  So, giving priority in definitions to some causes over other causes can answer riddles like these.

Further more, analyzing the “causes” of a thing’s creation, forces one to agree on when a thing actually comes into and out of existence, how to tell it apart from other similar things, how to count them, how to recognize it again in the future, and so forth.  Circularly, Causes also provide justifications for those agreements.  These criteria for identity help define the sortal definition of the thing (i.e. knowing how to sort these sorts of things from other sorts of things, and being able to count them on the way).

Case Studies: BigBank “Facilities” and “Customers”

I worked on some projects at "BigBank" (a recently defunct Top-5-in-the-USA bank) where these Philosophy-inspired techniques would have really helped.  Here are two case studies that illustrate the problems of modeling the parts but not the wholes.

In the first case study, BigBank (in order to meet new international banking standards) needed to retrofit its computer systems to record and report on their track record in guessing whether loans would be paid off eventually.  Each guess took the form of a “default grade” for a package of loans, each known as a “facility”.

A major problem was that their various systems did not agree on the basic definition of “facility”.  This was because the definition of a “facility” went so without saying that no one actually said (in a rigorous way) what it was.  Everyone interviewed knew intuitively what one was but couldn’t quite put it into words, and when pressed, it turned out that they all had different definitions from each other.  As a result, the various systems around the bank were built with different ontologies (i.e. models of the world).  A key problem was that many of BigBank’s systems assumed that Facilities were no more than the collection of their parts, and so only the parts were recorded with no standard place to say things about each Facility as a whole.  As a result, it came as a surprise to everyone that there had never been any agreement as to when which parts belonged to which wholes, nor even when any particular whole Facility came into or out of existence. Consequently, BigBank had several different “Facility ID”s, none of which agreed which each other, hence, no way to definitively report on the history of any particular Facility.

CASE STUDY:  At BigBank, credit grades are calculated for "facilities". A facility is a collection of "obligations" (i.e. loans, lines of credit) that are being considered together as a single deal and graded as a whole. The particular set of obligations grouped into each "facility" changes over time as individual obligations get paid off or expire. Plus, changed or not, the facilities are supposed to be re-graded from time to time.  Unfortunately, some key BigBank databases only had records for individual obligations. There was no Facility entity table.

So, for example, whenever a "facility" was (re)graded, in reality, only a set of obligation records were updated, all with the same single “facility-grade”. In fact, other than the loan officer's neurons, there was no record of which obligations had been associated with which "facility" over time.  So, when there was a new requirement to store for each facility all its grading documents, there was no place to put them. Even worse, since a Facility entity had never been formally defined, the analysis had never been done to make sure everyone had the same definition of a "facility" (which they didn't). There was no agreement on what the thing being graded actually was! For some, each individual grading event was considered a "facility" (along with its own "facility ID") because "the grading sheet is what is graded".

A second case study (which I detailed back in 2006) involves BigBank's treatment of customer information. Some BigBank systems defined Customer entities and assigned a single ID for each one, but other systems gave the same person or corporation a different ID in each state and called them Obligors. Once again, some systems modeled only the wholes (i.e. customers) and other systems only modeled the parts (i.e. obligors). And once again, because the systems working at the parts level did not tie them together as a whole, there was disagreement about which obligors belonged to which customers.  It had become so bad that the data model had to be changed to allow multiple customers to be tied to a single obligor, lest conflicting data feeds go unprocessed. It was like having Person records and BodyPart records, but needing to kludge in the ability to have multiple people associated with the same particular foot!

[1] chapter 5, this sentence is false, Peter Cave, 2009, Continuum, ISBN: 9781847062208
[2] Parts, Peter Simons, 1987, Oxford University Press
[3] Introducing Aristotle, Rupert Woodfin and Judy Groves, 2001

POSTSCRIPT - April 19th, 2010

I almost said that a person's DNA was unique until I remembered twins, triplets,etc. So, I started to add a reference to DNA+epigenetics in order to be able to say "unique", except that the "never changes" bit would no longer be true. Interesting "paradox" that epigenetics is needed to uniquely define/identify someone but it is ever-changing. This gets at the heart of the notion of essential versus accidental...it is unique to something but not essential to that same something.

An Adjective is a Noun is a Verb

In my earlier blog entry about Russell's Theory of Descriptions, it gave the example of rewording "The present king of France is bald" into a special descriptive form. You may have noticed in that discussion that the phrase "X is kingly" was used instead of a more natural sounding "X is a king". This is because Russell was attempting, via his special form of making statements, to remove all implicit claims that X exists, to be replaced with mere descriptions of X.

Programmers should think of this as the difference between:

"(x instanceof King) && x.bald && x.french"

versus

"select * from AllThingsTable where french='Y' and bald='Y' and kingly='Y'".

The former would blow up in Java with a null pointer exception if X didn't exist, whereas the latter in SQL would not blow up; it would merely return zero results meaning that none exist.

In philosophy, nouns are reworked into adjectives and even verbs all the time to make statements more precise. In Russell's template, nouns are reworked into adjectives. In process philosophy (where everything is considered a "process" rather than a "thing"), a "king" would really be considered the process of "kinging".

Lest all this awkward wordsmithing seem too artificial, a quick look at McWorter's video introduction to linguistics[1] will show that what seems natural to us, is English specific. He gives the example of "I like Pam", where "like" is a verb, but in Japanese, the equivalent "Pam ga suki" literally means "Pam likeableness". So, a concept in one language may naturally be an activity, but in another language, it's a noun form of an adjective.

[1] Understanding Linguistics: The Science of Language, John McWhorter
- http://www.teach12.com/ttcx/CourseDescLong2.aspx?cid=2270&pc=Social%20Sciences

- Understanding Linguistics: The Science of Language (Parts 1-3) DVDS & Guidebook 

A rose is a rose is (not) a rose

In several of my earlier blog entries, there was discussion as to whether words like "rose" have meanings, or are only references to things. Shakespeare thought they were only references to things when he wrote "A rose by any other name would smell as sweet". My conclusion to the contrary (based on "salt") has been given empirical evidence, as described in a story on National Public Radio[1].

Lera Boroditsky, an assistant psychology professor at Stanford University, had conducted experiments in which people were shown to be unconsciously affected by the language they spoke when they described things. In languages like German and Spanish that have "gender", each noun (unlike English) is either male, female, or neuter. However, languages aren't consistent with regard to the gender of any particular word. In German, the word for bridge is feminine, and in Spanish it is masculine. When test subjects were asked to provide words describing a picture of a bridge, the Germans came up with fragile, elegant, beautiful, peaceful, slender, and pretty, whereas the Spaniards came up with strong, dangerous, long, sturdy, big, and towering. Even when the test subjects were taught a completely made up language that had gender, they chose descriptions of things that matched the gender of the made up word for that thing.

So, when doing the business and technical analysis of systems, be aware of attached connotations and concept interrelationships before translating rich natural language words like Salary into antiseptic variable names like Foo.

[1] "Shakespeare Had Roses All Wrong", Robert Krulwich

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=102518565

Class Constructors considered harmful

My basic project these days is to learn Philosophy 101 and contemplate what impact that knowledge should have on software development practices.  After reading topics like the Philosophy of "becoming", and Aristotle's "four causes", it is clear that Philosophers spend much more time trying to define the circumstances of an entity's creation than do system analysts and programmers. While Philosophers have long been concerned with WHY did WHO do WHAT to cause an object to come into being, programmers are mostly concerned with the mechanics of HOW an object should be constructed.  It strikes me that this is due to the tunnel vision encouraged by the class constructor method.  [And, due to destructors and automated garbage collection, an even worse situation applies to object “death”.] So, to paraphrase a famous title, I (albeit tongue-in-cheek) consider Class Constructors harmful.

In the course of analysis and requirements gathering, a major goal is to identify and define the various business domain entities. But, in a vicious cycle, the definition of an entity is often too shallow with regard to its birth and death because “causal” information often stagnates as merely background text in some requirements document.  This is because programmers have no standard place to put that logic into the code.

Object oriented practice has one put "all" the properties and behavior associated with an entity into its Class definition, where "all" for class Dog means "the dog, the whole dog, and nothing but the dog"[1].  However the "nothing but the dog" constraint means that, the logic involved in deciding whether an instance of class X should be created, is not normally a method of class X.  Since the "cause" of X's instantiation usually involves other classes, that logic lies outside of X proper, thus, standard development methodologies leave the analysis of causation and purpose out of the design of class X.  Even Factory classes are focused on object construction, rather than why it should be constructed, and why now, and by whom.

The Mediation pattern comes to mind as a place to put this sort of logic because it involves multiple classes.  The logic that decides it is time for a Sculptor to use a Chisel to carve a Statue out of a block of Marble doesn’t belong solely in any of those classes.  A programmer would be tempted to put a “carve” method in Sculptor since that is a “behavior” of the sculptor, but Philosophy considers it an essential part of the definition of the statue itself.  And that is a problem with Mediator classes in the first place; the desire to have everything relevant to X be “nearby in the source code” (a raison d'être for classes) is defeated when some of it is off in various Mediators.  Having the teleology of Statue off in some CarveMediator isn’t much better than it residing in Sculptor.carve().

With event-driven systems (e.g. MOM, SOA), the series of events that trigger the creation of an entity instance may be complex. And whether event-driven, or "batch processing", the sub-systems are often distributed, increasing the value of encapsulating this logic in a single place. With Java EE and service oriented designs, there would be value in having the entity services include this logic.

In any event, I believe that there is a need to learn from Philosophy that their concept of "form" (which is the equivalent of OOP's class) has always included the purpose of a thing as well as its blueprint.

[1] Object Oriented Analysis and Design, Grady Booch,  1991

What is the difference between an Ontology and a Taxonomy

The following has been posted on a few sites and I don't know which was the original. In any event, it is very germane to my purpose, so I republish it here...

A controlled vocabulary is a list of terms that have been enumerated explicitly. This list is controlled by and is available from a controlled vocabulary registration authority. All terms in a controlled vocabulary should have an unambiguous, non-redundant definition. This is a design goal that may not be true in practice. It depends on how strict the controlled vocabulary registration authority is regarding registration of terms into a controlled vocabulary. At a minimum, the following two rules should be enforced:

1. If the same term is commonly used to mean different concepts in different contexts, then its name is explicitly qualified to resolve this ambiguity.
2. If multiple terms are used to mean the same thing, one of the terms is identified as the preferred term in the controlled vocabulary and the other terms are listed as synonyms or aliases.

A taxonomy is a collection of controlled vocabulary terms organized into a hierarchical structure. Each term in a taxonomy is in one or more parent-child relationships to other terms in the taxonomy. There may be different types of parent-child relationships in a taxonomy (e.g., whole-part, genus-species, type-instance), but good practice limits all parent-child relationships to a single parent to be of the same type. Some taxonomies allow poly-hierarchy, which means that a term can have multiple parents. This means that if a term appears in multiple places in a taxonomy, then it is the same term. Specifically, if a term has children in one place in a taxonomy, then it has the same children in every other place where it appears.

A thesaurus is a networked collection of controlled vocabulary terms. This means that a thesaurus uses associative relationships in addition to parent-child relationships. The expressiveness of the associative relationships in a thesaurus vary and can be as simple as "related to term" as in term A is related to term B.

People use the word ontology to mean different things, e.g. glossaries & data dictionaries, thesauri & taxonomies, schemas & data models, and formal ontologies & inference. A formal ontology is a controlled vocabulary expressed in an ontology representation language. This language has a grammar for using vocabulary terms to express something meaningful within a specified domain of interest. The grammar contains formal constraints (e.g., specifies what it means to be a well-formed statement, assertion, query, etc.) on how terms in the ontology's controlled vocabulary can be used together.

People make commitments to use a specific controlled vocabulary or ontology for a domain of interest. Enforcement of an ontology's grammar may be rigorous or lax. Frequently, the grammar for a "light-weight" ontology is not completely specified, i.e., it has implicit rules that are not explicitly documented.

A meta-model is an explicit model of the constructs and rules needed to build specific models within a domain of interest. A valid meta-model is an ontology, but not all ontologies are modeled explicitly as meta-models. A meta-model can be viewed from three different perspectives:

1. as a set of building blocks and rules used to build models
2. as a model of a domain of interest, and
3. as an instance of another model.

When comparing meta-models to ontologies, we are talking about meta-models as models (perspective 2).

Note: Meta-modeling as a domain of interest can have its own ontology. For example, the CDIF Family of Standards, which contains the CDIF Meta-meta-model along with rules for modeling and extensibility and transfer format, is such an ontology. When modelers use a modeling tool to construct models, they are making a commitment to use the ontology implemented in the modeling tool. This model making ontology is usually called a meta-model, with "model making" as its domain of interest.

Bottom line: Taxonomies and Thesauri may relate terms in a controlled vocabulary via parent-child and associative relationships, but do not contain explicit grammar rules to constrain how to use controlled vocabulary terms to express (model) something meaningful within a domain of interest. A meta-model is an ontology used by modelers. People make commitments to use a specific controlled vocabulary or ontology for a domain of interest.