Scott is Scott

While reading Looking at Philosophy[1], I came across its discussion of Bertrand Russell's Theory of Descriptions[2]. It was a proposed solution to several problems that occur when logic propositions are made about an entity's existence or identity. One of the problems being solved was that a statement like "Scott is the author of the novel Waverley", if it is true, reduces to the statement "Scott is Scott". This is because in traditional logic, two terms that denote the same object can be interchanged without affecting the meaning or truth of a statement. But since "Scott is Scott" doesn't seem to be equivalent to "Scott is the author of Waverley", Russell proposed that a better way to state the latter was using the template:

There is an entity C, such that the sentence "X is Y" is true, iff X=C.

This would produce the sentence "There is an entity C, such that "X wrote Waverley" is true, if and only if X=C; moreover, C is Scott". What Russell was getting at was that there was a problem with the traditional view that a definite description could be exchanged with a proper name. A phrase describing something (e.g. "the author of Waverley") means something different than a name (e.g. Scott) because while it is true that "George IV wanted to know if Scott was the author of Waverley", it is false that "George IV wanted to know if Scott was Scott". Russell's template solved this problem along with others like making claims about non-existent things. E.G. "The present king of France is bald" is problematic because there is no present king of France. If it were considered false then "The present king of France is not bald" would have to be considered true. This is avoided by saying instead: There is an entity C, such that the sentence 'X is French, bald, and kingly' is true iff X=C. THAT statement is false (because there is no entity that fits that description), and its opposite is true (i.e. There is NOT an entity...).

[1] pg 322, "Looking At Philosophy: The Unbearable Heaviness of Philosophy Made Lighter", 2005, Palmer
[2] Existence and Description, Bertrand Russell from "Metaphysics: an anthology" by Jaegwon Kim, Ernest Sosa - 1999

  

Is there anything left after all the roles are stripped away?

While reading Looking at Philosophy[1], I came across its discussion of Kierkegaard saying that there is some existential being that is left when all the "roles" of that being are stripped away.  With my advocation in Existential Programming that "roles" be promoted over "is-a subclassing", it begs a deep question. If we have factored out all state and behavior from a class, moving them into various roles, when do we know that it is time to create a new instance of a "thing" to which roles will be attached?

For example, in a language like Javascript, one can create an empty object instance and dynamically add in attributes and methods later.  This capability can be used to implement "mixin" classes that each encapsulate the properties and behavior associated with some role.

While it is true that we can program the operations of instantiating an empty (i.e. essence-less) object and graft in the mixin classes for each role we expect to fulfill, the Philosophical question is, how could we know that a new blank instance is needed if we didn't have a particular "thing" in mind in the first place? I.E. doesn't a thing still have to start as a particular "kind" of thing in order to know when it is time to create a new one? 

In still other words, is there an actual case of a "thing" that consists only of roles? Are we sure that one of those roles isn't a thing itself?  Does the technology give us the capability to do something that makes no ontological sense?

[1] "Looking At Philosophy: The Unbearable Heaviness of Philosophy Made Lighter",2005, Palmer

Word Matters: Words Matter

In my earlier blog entries, I noted the debate over whether words had meanings, or were only references to things. It was noted that while "rose" and "gulaab" work equally well for speakers of English and Urdu, "Superman" was not interchangeable with "Clark Kent". This was because Superman and Clark Kent both referenced different aspects of the same entity instead of both referencing the same entity as a whole.

However, the actual words still didn't matter in that discussion. While Clark Kent was different than Superman, the actual word "Superman" didn't matter...it could have been "Clark Kent is different than Foo" (if everyone called the man of steel "Foo" instead of Superman).

After reading Salt: A World History[1], I've decided that words DO have their own meaning because of all the connotations, and rich web of connections with history, culture, and language, that go along with each. The book is chock full of nuggets like the following (paraphrased):

The first of the Roman roads, the Via Salaria (i.e. Salt Road), was built to bring salt not only to Rome but across Italy. It was important because at times the Roman soldiers were paid in salt which was the origin of the word salary and the expression "worth his salt" and "earning his salt". The latin word for salt (sal) became the French word for pay (solde) and that was the origin of the word soldier.

The book makes it obvious that the word Salt couldn't really be much different given its linguistic lineage. Words DO matter because each has a whole slew of connections to other things, and a past history, because each is part of a naturally evolved language. Words evolve from other words; they were not picked out of the air. There is a family tree of related words just like there is a family tree of organisms with related DNA.

Knowing the rich set of interconnections of words, their origins, history, etc makes a word like Salary carry many connotations that "foo" would not. A whole semantic network of related concepts lights up in my mind with the word Salary that would not have if the word for salt was foo.

[1] Salt: A World History, by Mark Kurlansky, 2002

[Ed. Note - 12/11/12: as per my disclaimers, once I start looking for my epiphanies on the net, I find them. E.G. in this case, see "Lecture 26: Culture, Hermeneutics, and Structuralism". Congrats Bruce, you've just discovered what Gadamer said a century ago: language itself is a historical accumulation, each term carrying its past usages which are part of its meaning.]